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Summary: Environmental policy instruments that encourage the uptake of 
environmental management measures have traditionally been focused at the level 
of the individual farm, and have aimed to re-direct the principal farm decision-
maker towards adoption of alternative management options using a combination 
of voluntary and mandatory measures. These have combined incentives, 
regulations and advice delivered through a variety of channels – or in Kenneth 
Boulding’s terminology: carrots, sticks and hugs. There is now widespread 
recognition that emphasis on policy designed for the single farm is not a sufficient 
condition for achieving desired environmental quality targets, in particular where 
scale and spatial coordination are significant factors in effective uptake. Drawing 
on research on environmental collective action in Scotland, we draw out some 
issues with a more collective approach to policy design, and identify some key 
research challenges that need to be met to make these approaches more viable in 
the future. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The range of policy options available to government for rural land management spans a wide 
range in theory, but the options available to specific agencies in practice are much narrower, 
constrained most clearly by both pragmatic considerations (most obviously financial and 
personnel resources) and regulatory jurisdiction. The underlying options in providing agri-
environmental delivery are essentially four-fold: 
 
• Changing how things are produced to ensure environmental goods and services are 
part of the process (eg Best Management Practices). 
• Changing where things are produced, to reduce pressure on sensitive areas. 
• Changing what is produced, to provide a better mix of goods and services, at a range 
of scales. 
• Changing who produces things, to enable specialization in areas of management 
expertise. 
 
Government and its responsible agencies have a range of policy instruments which can be 
deployed to bring about these changes, and these can be referenced to Kenneth Boulding’s 
(1989) analysis of power relations. The available ways of bringing about change can be 
pursued through broadly three strategies – the power of coercion (the stick), the power of 
exchange (the carrot), and the power of integration (the hug in Boulding’s own terminology - 
or the sermon to emphasise its persuasive rather than supportive element). These are more 
often described as economic instruments, regulation (or Command and Control) and moral 
suasion in the classic policy literature, although this is clearly a more narrow definition than 
that developed by Boulding. A summary list of the range of instruments available, broadly 
delineated by these categories, is shown in Table 1. 
 
It is important to note that though these elements are often separated, even quite specific 
instruments seldom exercise exclusively one kind of power (Frey, 1997). Thus pricing 
mechanisms for conservation goods not only offer the power of exchange, but send clear 
signals about the value from the public perspective of the goods that are being offered for 
exchange. Information provision can help to identify cost savings or profit opportunities that 
in turn bring their own rewards. Regulatory instruments backed up with the threat of 
prosecution also send a signal about what is ethically valued, as do market based instruments 
aimed at delivering similar quality targets but through more flexible mechanisms (Winter and 
May, 2001). Single instruments are not therefore typically limited to the exercise of only one 
kind of power, even though this is a convenient way of characterizing them. 
 
As Boulding notes, the hug is by far the most prevalent form of exercise of power, since it 
strikes to the heart of human relationships and is inherent in all efforts to engage humans in 
some form of activity. In Boulding’s terminology, the hug is founded on ‘love’, though 
reservations about the impact of such romantic language on political sensibilities have led to 
its more common characterization (suggested by Boulding himself) as ‘respect’. Thus 
although the power of exchange can be observed in recruiting farmers into various forms of 
agri-environmental schemes through payments, the success of these initiatives is still heavily 
reliant on mutual respect (essentially good will and honesty) on the part of participants, 
particularly when monitoring efforts are by necessity limited (Colman, 1994; Lowe et al., 
1997). 
 
 
TWO HOLY GRAILS OF AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
 
Many of the measures listed in Table 1 have been, and continue to be, employed with varying 
degrees of support and success. There is substantial experience of successful (in enrollment 
terms) initiatives and schemes, both broad and deep, led by agency project officers, extension 
staff, NGOs and government departments themselves (e.g. CRER, 2002). 
 
Two key objectives for rural land management have however been fairly consistently elusive 
– integrated delivery mechanisms, and coordinated uptake. Coordination is used here to refer 
to the appropriate scale of uptake, whether defined in relation to land area or numbers of 
participating farmers. Integrated delivery refers to multiple objectives that the state and its 
agencies hold in relation to the management of rural land, whilst acknowledging that land 
managers themselves are simultaneously involved in delivering multiple objectives for 
themselves and their families. These two key priorities add an additional complexity to policy 
delivery, but one where the challenges are significantly different to the past round of agri-
environmental scheme development: 
 
(1) A level of coordination in actions that brings synergy across multiple holdings. 
(2) A level of coordination in objectives that brings synergy in multiple outputs. 
 At a strategic level, the problem is not the number and range of possible individual 
instruments, but the inability to coordinate these sufficiently at a comprehensive enough scale 
and for a wide enough scope of objectives. The challenges here are numerous, including 
budgetary restrictions, jurisdictional boundaries, changing agency remits, competing 
stakeholder interests and pressures of new European legislation. 
 
In this context the introduction of Land Management Contracts (LMCs) offers a significant 
opportunity for far greater integration of objectives in delivery. The other challenge – 
coordination - has however remained relatively underdeveloped in both UK research and 
policy terms. Undoubtedly this reflects the underlying land ownership structure where 
examples of collective land management are now largely confined to the management of 
common grazings. The emphasis on collective action is however gaining prominence and 
reflects a new frontier for environmental working. 
 
 
COLLECTIVE INITIATIVES – PULLING MULTIPLE LEVERS 
 
Engagement in collaborative activities can be defined along a spectrum from Individual to 
Collective (Figure 1). At the individualistic end of the spectrum, farm actions are focused 
within a single farm boundary and without reference to wider objectives. At the other, 
collective, end of the spectrum lies full community land ownership, under which the entire 
decision making process involves collective action. Collaborative or collective activities 
involving multiple land managers occur along this spectrum, and their advantages in 
delivering on both agri-environmental and rural policy objectives have received some - 
though quite limited - attention in past research (e.g. Slangen 1994; Hagedorn, 2002; Franks, 
2003). 
 
From the individual land manager’s perspective, there are some clear advantages to both 
modes of operation (Table 2). Although the benefits of cooperation are easily listed, the 
benefits of individual operation are far more familiar to most land managers. Currently, it is 
apparent that incentives to move towards more collective forms of action for environmental 
outcomes are notably weak (Davies et al., 2004). Various types of zoning regulation are the 
clearest examples aimed at delivering a broad degree of spatial coordination, with specific 
catchment and habitat initiatives targeting specific objectives more closely. 
 
A principal advantage of collective action lies in its ability to address multiple objectives 
simultaneously, and to harness Boulding’s power of the ‘hug’ alongside more structured 
policy instruments. It can create a group which has the capacity to challenge traditional 
practice, and in which practices can be redefined, whilst simultaneously delivering - with the 
right supporting structures - direct benefits to participants either in efficiency savings or 
opening up new sources of revenue (either directly or indirectly) (Hagedorn, 2002). Four key 
elements of collective action can be characterised as co-learning, co-planning, co-acting, and 
co-funding. Some activities may be limited to only one of these, but the more intangible 
elements – co-planning and co-learning – offer the greatest potential to secure attitudinal 
change over time. 
 
Co
lle
ct
iv
e
In
di
vi
du
al
Jo
in
t b
ou
n
da
ry
 
m
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t
M
a
ch
in
e
ry
 
a
n
d 
la
bo
u
r 
 
sh
a
rin
g
Co
o
rd
in
a
te
d 
tim
in
g 
o
f o
pe
ra
tio
n
s
Co
o
pe
ra
tiv
e
 
m
a
rk
e
tin
g
Co
-
in
ve
st
m
e
n
t a
n
d 
fin
an
cin
g
Jo
in
t b
u
sin
e
ss
 
o
w
n
e
rs
hi
p
La
n
ds
ca
pe
 
sc
a
le
 
pl
a
n
n
in
g
Co
lle
ct
iv
e
In
di
vi
du
al
Jo
in
t b
ou
n
da
ry
 
m
a
n
a
ge
m
e
n
t
M
a
ch
in
e
ry
 
a
n
d 
la
bo
u
r 
 
sh
a
rin
g
Co
o
rd
in
a
te
d 
tim
in
g 
o
f o
pe
ra
tio
n
s
Co
o
pe
ra
tiv
e
 
m
a
rk
e
tin
g
Co
-
in
ve
st
m
e
n
t a
n
d 
fin
an
cin
g
Jo
in
t b
u
sin
e
ss
 
o
w
n
e
rs
hi
p
La
n
ds
ca
pe
 
sc
a
le
 
pl
a
n
n
in
g
 
  
Figure 1.  Individual-collective spectrum in farm management 
 
The impetus required to move land managers to a more collaborative approach in 
environmental management is however very substantial. Collaboration is costly in terms of 
time, is potentially risky, may take time to develop, can have uncertain objectives, and 
threaten to constrain flexibility (Franks, 2003). Faced with this prospect, the rewards from 
collaboration need to be clear, significant and timely. Commercial cooperative ventures 
struggle with all these factors and their limited penetration in UK agriculture has long been 
evidence of the difficulty of turning theoretical advantages into reality. 
 
 Table 2.  Benefits to land managers of Individual and Collective  
   management approaches 
 
Individual Benefits  Collective Benefits 
Speed of decision-making  Access to wider expertise 
Flexibility in management  More powerful resource base 
Personal pride in outcomes  Supportive learning environment 
Simplicity in control  Sharing of burdens 
Clear lines of responsibility 
Direct capture of benefits 
Enjoyment of autonomy 
 Potential capacity to specialize  
Realise economies of scale and scope 
Stronger voice in negotiation 
 
The driving forces for collaboration in the past have been essentially two-fold – problem-
solving, and income generation (see Davies et al., 2004) – and these principal motives are 
unlikely to change quickly. But securing benefits in response to either of these two motives is 
not inevitable even when the potential benefits of collaboration are clear. Environmental 
collective initiatives have almost universally in the past relied heavily on the driving force of 
project officers with time, expertise and access to funding to generate activity. The 
characteristics evident in generating enduring and productive collaborative action are complex 
and varied: 
 
• Critical mass to realize collective benefits at appropriate scale. 
• Clarity of purpose. 
• Rapid and self-evident initial results. 
• Outcomes exceed those available through individual effort alone. 
• Individual rewards accrue from collective organisation. 
• There are opportunities for continuing innovation and development. 
• Individuals feel in control of the process. 
• Sense of common goals and ownership. 
• Appropriate and available training. 
• Some secure funding streams to sustain cooperative engagement. 
• Voluntary participation due to shared opportunities for gain. 
• Strong and inspirational leadership. 
• Flexibility in response to new opportunities. 
• Continuing positive feedback and information flow to participants. 
 
The extent of collective actions have scale and scope limitations, and not all will meet all 
these conditions. If collective approaches are to yield more of their potential, significant 
innovation is needed in mechanisms to deliver on the problems raised by these factors; 
without such innovation, the potential for moving towards more collaborative environmental 
initiatives is likely to remain very weak. 
 
 
CHALLENGES FOR INNOVATION IN SUPPORTING MORE COLLABORATIVE 
ACTION 
 
It should be noted that not everything worth doing is worth doing collaboratively. What is 
important is to provide mechanisms to move to the appropriate point on the Individual-
Collective spectrum – appropriate defined importantly in relation to the needs of both farmers 
and agencies, and the circumstances within which they are operating. 
 
Collective approaches need therefore to be constructed from, and responsive to, complex 
combinations of incentives, regulation and social pressures that can effect these transitions. At 
present there are many good examples of past collaborative initiatives built on project 
officers’ expertise (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000); but to build on this experience in the UK 
context, developments are needed in several key fields: 
 
(1) in monitoring systems that can enable greater clarity in benefits delivery: 
 - audit systems that send more precise and appropriate signals to managers 
 - strengthening returns to individual efforts within collective ventures 
 
(2) in understanding the full benefits of coordinated environmental actions 
 - provision of evidence on scale and scope benefits from co-implementation 
 - recognition of the widest possible set of values delivered at the landscape scale 
 
(3) in leveraging additional rewards from other sources to reward multi-farm, multi-
objective initiatives: 
 - circumventing the audit controls constraining government expenditure 
 - tailoring activities to local circumstances and opportunities 
 (4) in mechanisms that enable farmers to tap into location-specific environmental 
expertise 
 - stimulating farmer engagement in defining, rather than just delivering, on local  
    priorities 
 - monitor and demonstration style farms, connected to environmental support  
    groups 
 
(5) in creating farm-level incentives to increase recruitment to collective initiatives 
 - by increasing cooperative rewards linked to larger scale initiatives 
 
(6) in using collective initiatives as gateways to other desired services 
 - specialist training and software (eg in nutrient budgeting) via group membership 
 - compulsory elements of training in combination with farmer-defined priorities 
 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENT 
 
Land Management Contracts should provide for a level of integration in agri-environmental 
policy delivery exceeding past approaches; however delivering coordination across holdings 
remains exceptionally challenging under prevailing institutional structures. In seeking to re-
orientate land managers to greater prioritization of environmental outcomes, Boulding’s 
observation on the power of the hug in particular may be particularly timely. To quote Senator 
Robert Byrd (speaking in 2003 on a very different topic, the invasion of Iraq): 
 
 ‘the real power of America lies not in its will to intimidate, but in its ability to 
inspire’. 
 
The step from coercion to inspiration is the necessary internalization of values that creates a 
community of shared interest from a disparate collection of individuals, a point observed two 
millennia ago by Aristotle (2000). Many, if not most farmers continue to fail to be inspired by 
the opportunities offered by environmental land management as a core activity, not only 
because it is a significant change of focus, but because it fails to offer dynamic opportunities 
for continuing positive innovation, rewards structured to monitorable outputs, flexibility in 
delivery, and accessible benchmarks for these processes. Group structures are not a panacea 
for addressing these concerns, but they do offer a channel through which innovative responses 
to these challenges might be more effectively nurtured. 
 Table 1.  A typology of agri-environmental policy instruments 
 
 Emphasis on use in UK* 
Economic   
Transferable property resource rights - 
Land covenants and trusts + 
Negotiated conservation management agreements +++ 
Competitive public goods contracts +++ 
Posted performance bonds - 
Crop insurance services + 
Hypothecated tax instruments - 
Tax relief and exemptions + 
Input substitution subsidies - 
Equipment upgrade grants + 
Output tariffs - 
Graduated user fees and charges - 
  
Regulatory   
Offset arrangements/planning concessions - 
Leasing and licensing schemes + 
Producer accreditation schemes ++ 
Zoning and development controls ++ 
Statutory procedural regulations +++ 
Output/input controls and quotas ++ 
  
Persuasive   
Electronic and print media information services ++ 
Advisory and extension services ++ 
Process and product research and development + 
Education and training entitlements - 
Prizes and Award Schemes + 
Voluntary Audits and Monitoring ++ 
Monitor and demonstration farms + 
Producer clubs - 
Discussion forums + 
‘Naming and shaming’ initiatives - 
Green Benchmarking + 
  
Mixed  
Product certification schemes/green marketing ++ 
Industry sponsored producer clubs + 
Cross compliance conditions +++ 
Local food initiatives + 
Regional development/diversification initiatives + 
Environmental clubs and cooperatives - 
[* – very little or not used; + low emphasis; ++ medium emphasis; +++ high emphasis] 
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